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To Chma scholars and laymen alike, Chma’s foreign pohcy behavior 
appears to be mconsistent, erratic and above al, unpredictable Scholars 
disagree widely on the explanations and interpretations of Beijing’s 
policy p白tures'.＇』 In血efirst two d田adesof communist rule, China 
studies were handicapped by the paucity of information from mainland 
China Analyses on the conduct of China's foreign pohcy by seasoned 
Chma-watchers resembled the famous blmd men and the elephant 
analogy, each offering a partial and distorted picture of B田町jing’spolicy 
behav10r. After China’s dramallc turn to the West in the early seventies, 
however, mformation from mainland China such as first-hand accounts 
of foreign journalists and stat1St1cs released by Chinese officials began to 
flood the West. The traditional case study approach to Chinese foreign 
policy has been crillc1zed as unsystemallc and atheoretical'." Concerned 
students of contempo四ryChina have developed theones for explaining 
Beijmg’s foreign policy behavior. Yet, primarily because of their tra担ー
ings, backgrounds and personal biases, scholars have attempted to resolv-
ing the China puzzle from different perspectives. The purpose of this 
article is to evaluate the various, contending theories of Chmese foreign 
policy in Western scholarship. 
I HISTORICAL APPROACH 
Some scholars m剖ntamthat the complexity of Chinese foreign policy 
behav10r can be adequately interpreted and understood only in teロnsof 
China’s historical experience in both its domestic development and 
external contacts.＂』 Thehistorical approach emphaSizes the contmuity 
of αtin a’s foreign policy After more than a century of humiliating 
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defeats and suffenngs under foreign powers, the histoncal school argues, 
China is particularly sensitive to any outside interference in its domestic 
and foreign policies. Prolonged weakness has also created a sense of 
insecunty among Chinese leaders In addition, modern China’s pre-
occupation with the domestic goals of economic development and social 
revolution has cond1t10ned the Chmese reaction to foreign afairs. Thus, 
according to吐ieh1stoncal school, Chma’s policy predispositions and 
priorities such as its overt concerns with natwnal sovereignty, territonal 
mtegnty, independence and equality with other nations are al rooted m 
modern Chinese society Indeed, as remarked by one noted scholar, the 
elements of continmty m Chinese foreign pohcy are so strong that a shift 
in Chmese diplomacy could only be caused by “convulsive upheavals”on 
the international scene'." 
The mainstream of the historical school has portrayed China as cau-
tious, prudent and mward-lookmg, preoccupied itself with efforts in 
building up a umfied, strong and modern state. China’s alliance with 
the Soviet Union and its“'le阻 ed-to-one-side”以obalstrategy of the 
fifties was explained as necessitated by China’s strategic and defense 
needs under hostile American cont剖nmentpohcies, likewise, China’s 
sharp turn to the West, especially to the United States, in the early 
seventies was explained in terms of Beijmg’s concerns about terntonal 
integrity threatened by the Russians. Even China’s border wars with 
India (1962), the Soviet Union (1969) and Vietnam (1979) were ex-
plained (or expl副nedaway) by some scholars as Chi問、“defensive”
offensive in maintaining its territorial integrity. Yet not al China schol-
ars are sympathetic to the Chinese cause. Some regard Imperial China 
iust as expansionistic as other colonial powers It would be a grave mis-
take, a writer had warned, to overlook traditional Chinese ambition 
in Central Asia because Communist China’s ambit10n was to restore 
China to由ehmits of Qian Long's empire'." Even more alarmmgly 
(because of i同racialimplications), China was regarded by one renowned 
scholar as following the path of the “Yellow Peril”， pursumg a“delib-
erate m出taryattempt at changing吐ieexisting frontier.""' Ostensibly, 
there is no easy clue to interpret the complexity of several thousand 
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years of Chinese history It is thus no surprise that scholars disagree 
widely, even diametrically, on the impact of China’S Impenal past on 
Beijing’s diplomacy. 
In terpretmg Chm a’s foreign policy behavior in terms of its historical 
precedents has a built-m tendency to over-emphasize也eumqueness of 
the Chmese experience. After al, national independence, sovereignty 
and territonal mtegrity are universal goals eagerly sought-after by al 
nations, especially developing states which, hke Chma, have emerged 
from decades of colomal or semi-colonial rules Then why did Beij血E
behave differently from other developing countries in global politics? 
A more satisfactory answer may thus he elsewhere rather than in Chinese 
tradition. Furthermore, to argue that the Chinese case is unique is to 
underestimate the important process of“mtematrnnahza!Jon”. It is 
inconceivable that the People’s Republic of China σRC) has not some-
what conformed to international noロnsafter three decades of dealings 
with foreign nations and more than ten years’expenence with the 
United Nations and other international organizations. 
The historical approach also has its inherent weakness as a theory 
or model for explainmg Chinese 品目eignpohcy behavior. It is a static 
rather than a dynamic model. While emphasizing the impact of political 
and回目altraditrnns, the histoncal school neglects that cultural and 
social values of a nation are not constant but always changmg and evolv” 
ing In fact, no senous students of Chinese politics would deny that the 
present culture and society of mainland China is very different from old 
Chma We can not, therefore, write off the ffect ofMarxism-Lenmism-
Maoism on shaping the Chmese communist ideology as well as the PRC’s 
world outlook It would be a mistake to regard Beijing’s polemical policy 
statements as mere rhetoncs. Information affecting China’s perceptions 
and evaluations of the mternational situation 1s filtered through出e
Chinese leaders' ideological predispositrnns At most, today’s China is 
a mere shadow of its past. 
This is not to deny the value of the histoncal approach. It provides 
a broad and general understanding of China’s foreign policy as well as a 
rationale for B吋ing'ssometimes erratic, unpredictable behavior How-
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ever, a historical interpretation is helpless in explain泊gor predict泊E
specific foreign policies. One can of course cite numerous historical 
precedents in a post hoc explanation, yet none of them may be the real 
cause of由ecurrent event In short, history may be irrelevant. 
I BALANCE OF POWER APPROACH 
Evolving from a century old concept that described elegantly 19出
Century European polillcs, the balance of power theory has many 
followers from the academ抽出idthe diplomatic circles According to the 
main premise of the theory, nat10ns are pmnarily concerned about their 
national security Nat10ns are therefore prone to shiftmg alliances m 
order to assure a stable military balance with neighboring s臼tes The 
rapid advance of mtl1tary technology m the last three decades that 
enabled the two superpowers to possess global reach capab出tyhas 
sustained and stimulated enthusiasm m apply担gthe bal叩ceof power 
由eoryThe world-wide concerns w1血 energysupplies in recent years, 
moreover, have given additional weight to geostrategic calculations. This 
does not mean to suggest, of course, that balance of power theonsts have 
ignored other poli!!cal, social and economic factors m their analyses. In 
白ct,many are aware of other forces than military considerations that 
may determme pohcy formulation. Nevertheless, balance of power 
theonsts more or les agree that strategic calculations prevatl when a 
country’s national security is at stake. Commenting on China’s foreign 
policy from a balance of power perspective a noted Chma scholar wrote: 
“When Beijmg’s leaders believe vital Chinese security are at stake, these 
take clear precedence over other mterests，四drealpolitik considerat10ns 
and balance of power approaches come to the fore.”m 
Accordmg to the balance of power school, strategic calculations 
dictate Chmese policies toward the United States, the Soviet Union, 
Japan and other countries There is litle doubt that China’s overwhehn-
ing security concern is with the血reatfrom the north Beijing stil has 
some options, however, the balance of power theorists believe'" One 
obvious choice for the Chinese leaders is to lean to one side like what 
they did m early 1950s when they leaned to the Soviet side-and to rely 
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totally on U.S. military technology and supplies, throuゆU.S.alies or 
even directly from the U S. when出atbecomes possible. In effect, Chma 
wil become a U.S. aly. This option has the advantage of enabling the 
Chmese to rapidly modernize theu defense. It may also, however, 
provoke the Soviets to attempt preemptmg China’s modemization 
efforts by using military forces. Altematively, the Chinese may choose 
a slower but safer route to mcrease their m1日tarycapability They may 
seek from the United States and its alies technology know-how that c阻
be developed by theu own efforts for military purpose In 白血eroption, 
however, a bal叩 ceof power st四tegistmay ar即日e,Be11ing will皿creaseits 
ties with Japan，吐ieUS. and other Western countries that wil certainly 
arouse Soviet apprehensions and keep the two communist nvals away 
from rapprochement Indeed, one writer even argues出atBeijing will 
deliberately avoid any rapprochement with Moscow as a gesture to please 
廿ieWestern countriesおrmore technology products and other benefits'" 
It is thus not difficult to understand the appeal and the popularity of 
the balance of power approach in explaining China’s relations with other 
m吋orpowers If Chinese leaders and leaders of other major powers 
perceive internat10nal s1tuat10ns solely from a strategic perspective, 
China’s pohcy options and limitations町eseemingly clear and predict-
able. Yet it is precisely也isdeceptive predictability血atcasts doubt on 
血evalidity of strategic阻 alys田.In an increasingly complex and inter-
dependent world the decision-makers of a few major powers can no 
longer control the outcome of international events S泊ceChina’s bila-
teral relations w1廿1countnes o血erth阻 ti)em勾orindustrial powers are 
ignored by the balance of power血eonsts,Chma’s policy interests and 
calculations are often distorted. For instance, Beijing’s avowed concerns 
about the new international economic order叩dits self-proclaimed 
spokesman’s role for Third World states are considered as mere rhetoncs 
with no real policy significance by balance of power theorists. 
The bal叩ceof power approach emphasizes the impact of the external 
environment on the conduct of China’s foreign policy Scholars from 
this school argue由atChinese policy has been determined or conditioned 
by the changing power pattern of global politics. Because of血een or-
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mous capability gap between China and the two superpowers, 1! is 
argued, Beijing has no choice but to react to the slnftmg environment 
with litle room for pohcy mil!al!ves. Domestic Chinese pohtics and 
Be11mg’s pohcy priorities and objectiv田 arethus regarded by balance of 
power theorists as恒significantm determining the regime’s foreign 
policy behavior. Likewise, smce the balance of power approach has been 
equated to realpolitik, the role of ideology is downgraded, if not totally 
discarded 
The major weakness of the balance of power approach, however, is 
its over-emphasis on Chma’s security concerns China of course, hke 
other nations, is concerned about its nat10nal security. Yet China is not 
Hungary, Korea, Kampuchea or Israel. Its vast land area with harsh 
topographical conditions and i臼 hugepopulation impose a formidable 
deterrence against any possible future mvaders. The Chmese leaders seem 
to be confident of repelling foreign invaders by relying on Mao Zedong’s 
“people’s war”strategy, despite China’s inferior weapons目 TheSoviet 
Union's failure to wm a decisive war agamst the local思iernllasthree 
years after its invasion of A毎hanistanhas reinforced the Beijing leaders’ 
belief in the invincibility of a people’s war. The balance of power st-
rategists, however, sl!ckmg by the power politics tradit10ns, choose to 
ignore血epsycholo副caland moral dimensions of warfare. They insist 
that China, like it or not, must play出epower game in order to ward off 
the military threats from its enemies目 Chinesemoves toward or retreat 
from the West have thus been interpreted by scholars of this school as 
deliberate power games “American card" or“Soviet card" played 
by Bei1ing, notwithstanding the latter’s vehement denial. 
Furthermore, it is often forgotten白at出egreat m勾orityof China’s 
foreign policies have litle to do wi出i臼security.China is not under any 
imminent military attack, its m司orforeign policies are made without 
being threatened. Indeed, the major thrust of China’s current foreign 
policy is its concerns with the modernization programs, which put eco-
nomic development a clear priority over defense. To analyze China’s 
foreign policy from a balance of power perspective may thus misread 
Beijing’s policy担tent10nsand c問atemisunderstanding in dealing with 
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the Chinese. The current stalemate of Sino-Amencan conflict over 
由eTaiwan issue is partly caused by Washington’s miscalculation of 
Beijing's pobcy objectives Washmgton’s balance of power strategists 
have over-estimated China’sおarof the Russians and hence Beijing’s 
dependence on the U.S. and under-estunated policy ramifications of 
China’s resolve in striving toward a unified, strong. and modern state. 
国 NEO-IDEOLOGICALAPPROACH 
During the Cold-War years of the日ftiesand early sixties and before 
the disputes between Beijmg and Moscow became open, China was 
perceived by many scholars as an aggre田ivepower, pursuing relentle田：ly
its military and poht1cal goals It was sugg田tedthat the basic force be-
h恒d也lSa飽ress1vednve was the world communist movements, or com-
munization, which was regarded by one scholar as the goal of Chinese 
foreign policy.'" The neo-ideological approach, however, regards 
ideology not as出e“end”ofBe首ing'sforeign policy but ra由er血e
“means”which the Chinese leaders use to analyze the global s1tuat10n 
阻 dto defme China's international role'."' 
The central thesis of the neo-ideological approach argues that血e
conduct of China’s foreign policy is primarily determined by Beijing's 
analyses of major contradicl!ons among political forces in global polil!cs 
In the 1950s, according to the neo-ideological school, the pnncipal con-
tradiction in global politics was perceived by Chinese leaders as that 
be tween the socialist c田npled by the Soviet Union and the capitalist 
camp dominated by the United States China declared its international 
role as a member of the socialist camp, acknowledging the Soviet leader-
ship. It is argued由atideological nece田ity,therefore, rather血an血e
fear of encirclement by the United States, drove Communist China lean-
ing one-sided to the SoVIet Umon in the fifties. By the mid-s!Xties, 
however, the prmcipal contrad1ct10n was perceived by Beijing as that 
between the two superpowers, which were contendmg for world power 
supremacy. The two opposmg camps no longer existed. The “inter-
mediate zone”of Western developed states and the developing countries 
were exploited and oppressed by the two superpowers. China’s self-
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proclaimed role had出usshifted from a member of the socialist camp to 
血echampion of medmm and small nations as well as the new“center of 
communist movementヘafteraccusing the Soviet Union of abandoning 
communism and tum加Eto rev1s10nism. Hence China advocated an an世－
So-吋et,anti-U S. policy回 da hard-line revolutionary diplomacy担血e
mid-and late sixties. 
Be伊即時inthe early 1970s, according to血eneo-ideological school, 
there was aga泊 am司orshift泊 China’sanalyses of contradict10ns in 
world politics. The principal contradiction has since been regarded as 
that between世田 twosuperpowers and the intermediate zone states, 
whlch are now re-classified as the Second World developed and Third 
World developing nations叩 Beijinghas therefore urged the formation 
of an international “anti-hegemony”umted front compnsing al nat10ns 
ag出nstthe two superpowers, especially the more aggressive Soviet Union. 
Declaring that China belongs to the Third World, Beijing acts as a spokes-
man for the Third World and puts itself at the forefront of the“anti-
hegemony" united front. China’s strategic shifts, the neo-ideolog1cal 
school argues, have thus been caused by Beijing’s changing ideological 
outlook that affects the Chinese leaders' asse田mentof the international 
situation and hence theu strategic moves. 
To a scholar of the neo-1deological school, the balance of power 
approach offers only a narrow and superficial explanation of Chlna’S 
foreign policy since Beijing’s strategic changes have litle to do m血
external threats Also, in contrast to the historical approach，也eneo・
ideolo国calschool discards the possible impact of Chinese tradition 
while emphasizing出e回portanceof Marxism-Leninism-Maoism on 
China’s world outlook Yet, under close examination, the neo-1deologi-
cal approach is even. more vulnerable and subject to cnticism than血e
historical or balance of power approach. There is a fundamental flaw in 
the neo-ideological arguments Ideology no doubt plays a very unport 
ant“symbolic”function such as rallying domestic support in formulatmg 
China's foreign pohcy; it is often, however, added after a“realistic” 
a田essmentof the international situation. That is, ideology is used by廿ie
Chinese leaders as a justification for China’s foreign policy behavior. In 
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fact, Beijmg’s analyses of contradictions in global politics are determmed 
by its foreign policy goals and national interests. Analyses of “contradic-
llons”are出usmore likely the effects and not the causes of China’s 
global strategies, the exact reverse of the neo-1deologlcal thesis For 
泊stance,China’s split with the Soviet Union began when Beijing stil 
regarded itself as a member of the socialist camp, likewise, Beijing took 
steps to normalize relations with the U S. m the early 1970s even though 
the latter was stil officially regarded as Chma’s chief enemy Indeed, one 
will only be puzzled and confused in seeking the causes of Chma's 
foreign policy from Be11ing's ideolog1cal rhetorics. 
At best, Beijmg’s selιdefined role orientation gives us a general and 
partial understanding of China’s policy obj田tiv回 andlimitations Like 
the historical and balance of power approaches, the neo-1deolog1cai 
school does poorly in explainmg or pred1ctmg spec1f1c Chinese foreign 
policies. Moreover, a country’s self-proclaimed international role 1s 
subject to approval by other nations. Do Third World developing nations 
regard and accept China as their spokesman? Do small states trust China, 
it田Ifa major power? It is thus equally import叩 tto examine China’S 
international role as perceived by other nations Yet this is largely 
neglected by出eneo-1deological school 
N COGNITNE APPROACH 
Unhke the aforementioned approaches, the cognillve approach 
borrows heavily concepts and theories from other disciplines, particular-
ly psychology and communication theones. The central thesis of the 
approach a田町ts血atthe Chinese leaders behave and act according to 
their defmiUons and perceptions of global situations, which they analyze 
by usmg complex “decision-rules”.＂＇ These decision-rules are directly 
related to the Chinese leadership’s“operational code" belief systems -
beliefs pertaining to, among others, the nature of politics, human rela-
tions, functions of history, the role of chance in strate伊ccalculations, 
risl《ーtakingand timing in policy加 plementations.The cognitive school 
血usemphasizes the study of beliefs and attitudes of Chinese leaders and 
follows closely the changes of Chinese leadership. 
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Scholars of this school have singled out four bimodal attitude pairs 
which they claim are particularly pertinent to Chinese decision-makmg 
about critical international incidents optimism-pe田加1ism,boldness-
caution, rigid1ty-flexibility and emotional arousal-analytic distance＂‘i 
It is argued that the Chmese leaders are often optimistic, bold, ngid 
or uncompromising, and emotionally aroused about China’s long-tenn 
policy goals, yet they could be ext田melyskeptical, caut10us, flexible, 
and objective in specific encounters with the enemy. Among these 
attitude pairs，血eopt凶 ism-pessimismbimodality is regarded as the most 
important m日 1mm helping Chmese decis10n-makers to cope wi血 the
stress and uncertainties of international poht1cs目 Theoptimism com-
ponent stresses the inevitable vindication of the communist cause and 
consequently reduces psychological stress resulting from the inherent 
uncertainties of the situation; the pess凶ismcomponent stresses the 
泊ev1tabilityof setbacks and mental preparat10n for them In sum, the 
proponents of the cogn山veapproach assert, the first element in each 
bimodality has particular import for broad, long-run Chinese fore靭
pohcy“strategies”， while the second for “tactical”decisions about 
immediate actions in specific situations日
The cognitive approach studies the perceptions and beliefs of出e
Chinese leaders by systematic content analyses of oficial Chme田 docu-
ments and pre回 Despitethe use of sophisticated research methods and 
the p泊nstaklngefforts of the analysts, there are senous drawbacks in the 
cognitive approach. First, there is always a gap between “manifested” 
beliefs such as that indicated in public documents and the actual or 
“latent”beliefs of the policy makers In a country like China where 
foreign policy debates are regarded as top secrets pertaining to nat10nal 
security, the behefs or perceptions of mdividual leaders are al but 
suppressed恒 governmentdocuments It is virtually impossible to 
discern actual beliefs of individual leaders from official attitudes in 
tigltly controlled mass media 
Second, the cognitive approach a田umesthat there exists a common 
“operation叫 code"belief system町nongthe Chmese leaders. This 
assumption is false, however The Chinese mass media may give un-
Theories of Chinese Foreign Policy 63 
animous views on policy 1田ues.Yet the views expres市edin official press 
represent only the policy stands of血eleadership faction that controls 
the mass media, which may or may not be in congruence with the official 
policy posit10n taken by the Foreign Ministry. Even the Chinese govern-
ment has admitted that gross mistakes or distorted views had been 
reported in official mass media dunng the Cultural Revolution when the 
media were controlled by the radical leftists. In any case, there is no 
strong evidence to support the exIStence of a common“operational 
code" among the Chinese leaders in conducting their foreign policies目
Third, the gap between beliefs and actual policy behavior remains 
unresolved. It 1s a common knowledge tn social science that a person 
may not act in accord with his beliefs and attitudes There is no attempt, 
however, by the cognitive school to study systema!Ically the correlations 
between beliefs and policy outputs There 1s no way to know how one 
behef may affect, and to what extent, a specific pohcy叩 tput;neither is 
it possible to compare the relative impact of various, sometimes incom-
patible, beliefs on policy formulation. For one thing, it IS extremely 
difficult to draw a !me between long term and short-term goals, or 
strategic and tactical moves. It is not clear how the incompatible bi-
modal beliefs compromise and affect China’s intermediate goals or 
policy moves lymg somewhere between the strategic and tactical calcula-
!Jons. The Chinese, after al, stres the“whole system”approach and 
assert that one wrong policy move may cost the whole g町ne.
Fourth, there 1s no attempt to analyze the correlat10ns between 
various behefs. In what way and to what extent do beliefs affect each 
other? Are there any“core”behefs that dominate other beliefs and the 
decISion-making process? Are the Chmese ehte’s belief systems umdi-
mensional or multi dunens1onal? In another study, I have found that 
there are only weal三， ifany, correlations between the “operational code" 
beliefs of Canada’s foreign policy elite; neither have I found any“core” 
beliefs which can explain satisfactortly the conduct of Canada’s foreign 
policy. I have thus concluded出atthe “operational code" belief systems 
are mere clusters of behefs, unrelated to each other, and have httle 
unpact on foreign pohcy dec1s10n-making:" The cognitive approach to 
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analyze Chinese foreign policy has not succeeded to disapprove my 
earlier conclusions. 
V TOWARD A THEORY OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY 
From the above discussions, it lS clear that a general or grand theory 
of Chinese foreign pohcy has yet to be developed I have pointed out 
the m司orarguments and shortcomings of various attempts to explain 
China’s foreign policy. At best, each approach by itself offers only a 
parl!al explanation of Beijing’s behavior. All do better in explaining廿le
general direction of China’S policies th四 predictingspecific policy 
moves A combination of the four approaches may give us a more com-
prehensive understanding of China’s foreign policy, but出isis not血e
solution to our search for an adequate theory. There are some common 
flaws and methodological limitations underlying the various approaches 
that have to be overcome first in the strenuous process of theory de-
velopment 
First, the current contending approaches al stress on identifying泊－
dependent variables, or causes, in Chma’s foreign policy The historical 
approach, for example, stres the importance of Chinese nal!onal1sm, 
tradition, territorial and security concerns as the m吋orc四日sof Beijing’s 
behav10r; likewise, the neo ideological school stresses communist ideol-
ogy and revolutionary movements, the balance of power theorists stress 
realpolitik and national interes臼， andthe cogmtive approach stresses the 
perceptions and beliefs of decision-makers Yet none of the approaches 
has focused on examining the dependent variables and s1tuat10nal varia-
bles of China’s foreign pohcy There lS no systematic effort to study the 
causal linkages between independent and dependent variables. 
As a result, it is never spelled out clearly the rela!lve impact of an 
independent variable such as, for example, Chinese nationalism on白e
formulation of policies泊 theareas of military-security, political-
diplomatic, and economic-technological issues. Obviously it is naive and 
absurd to assume that nationalism is equally important in influencing 
dec!S10n-making in al issue areas But scholars from the h1stoncal school 
have not given us a satisfactory answer as to how nationalism, and to 
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what extent, shapes policy outputs担 variouspolicy isues. Moreover, 
even wi出in血esame issue area the impact of nationahsm on pohcy 
formulation may vary when出e“target”ofChina’s policy is different. 
For担stance,the Chinese were ostensibly equally heroic and patnotic 
when they were自由tmgag剖nst吐ieRussians and世間Vietnamese,yet 
Beijing’s military posture toward its northern neighbor ismuch more 
prudent and les venturesome than its policy toward the south. In addi-
ti on, under what s1tuat1on is the decision made? Aroused nat10nahsm 
may serve as the crucial motivation for military ventures in t加esof crisis 
situation, but it may lose much of its emot10nal appeal in normal or non-
crisis situat10n when realistic, geostrategic calculallons prevail. One c皿
easily extend the example of Chinese nationalism to other independent 
variables such as communist ideology, balance of power strategies, or 
belief systems of policy ehtes and examine theu relative impact on ・ 
foreign pohcy formulation in various issue areas under different situa-
lions A systematic study mapping the causal relations between in-
dependent, dependent and situational variables is thus badly needed as a 
first step toward a general theory of Chinese foreign policy. 
Second, students of Chmese pohllcs are often too emotionally in-
volved m their analyses Anti-communist scholars who stil lament on 
having“lost”China to the commumsts describe Beijing as an a路ress1ve,
expansionist regime. Every single move of the regime is considered as 
part of a grand Chinese strategy, a泊iingat regional hegemony or ass1stmg 
commumst msurgent activities. Scholars more sympathetic to Beijing, on 
the other hand, stress the elements of tradition, nationalism阻 dcon-
sistency in Chma’s foreign p。!icy;they ar伊ethat China would venture 
outside of its border orily when provoked by hostile enemies Ironically, 
both the critics and sympathizers of the communist regime stres the con-
tinuity and rationality of Beijing’s foreign polici田 andthat the Chinese 
behave in a cool-headed, calculated manner m accord m出 theirpohcy 
objecllves. Few scholars have paid attention to possible Chinese policy 
mistakes and miscalculations After the death of Mao and the arrest of 
出eGang of Four, even the Chinese leaders themselves admitted that 
numerous pohcy mistakes had been committed during由eturmoil of the 
66 
Cultural Revolution 
This is apparently due not merely to oversight of China scholars, it is 
a direct result of China studies that attempt to“rationalize”al Chmese 
policy moves. In some extreme cases obv10us policy blunders such as the 
Red Guards' anarchic demonstrations ag副nstforeign embassies in Beijing 
and abroad had been interpreted by China-watchers as part of China’s 
revolutionary diplomacy. In fact, the Chinese Foreign Ministry itself was 
then controlled by the ruthless Red Guards and ceased to function for 
a few days. Even in the area of military-security issues, the Chinese 
leaders may also commit policy mistakes. A noted Chma expert has 
pointed out that China had initiated the Quemoy 1958 crisis as a result 
of Mao’s miscalculat10ns of American strategies and intents in the Taiwan 
Strait'" Deng Xiaopmg may also have miscalculated Hanoi before 
launchmg a full-scale military attack against the Vietnamese in the 
spring of 1979. Admittedly, 1t is difficult to detect Chinese“m1scalcula-
tions”， partly because of the deliberately ambivalent Chmese pohcy 
motives as well as the rhetorical, post hoc rationalization of policy 
actions offered by the Clunese themselves. Beijing could thus hide its 
possible policy mistakes and claimed that China had achieved its objec-
lives of“punishmg”the Vietnamese even though the border war ended 
inconclusively Yet, neglecting possible Chinese policy miscalculations 
could hardly help but impede our theory building efforts. 
Finally, despite the relal!vely more open society in post-Mao China, 
the inaccessibility of many relevant research materials remains the major 
stumbling block to study Chinese politics and foreign policy. We have 
already pomted out the validity problem m analyzing official Chinese 
policy statements and the government controlled mass media Further-
more, without access to various policy inputs and deliberations during 
the. policy making process we know very litle about the loci of power泊
the Chinese leadership. Press mterviews of top level Chinese leaders, 
which are rare in any case, indicate merely carefully momtored official 
positions. It is a taboo to Chinese leaders to talk about foreign affairs 
m public, especially to foreigners It 1s thus extremely difficult, if 
po田ible,to study the policy v1ewpomts and positions of individual 
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leaders Many well-established research methods in studying mterna-
tionai relations and comparatJve foreign policies such as the decis10n-
m政恒Eapproach and the bureaucratic politics approach could hardly 
be apphed to由eChinese case for the lack of sufficient mformation 
We should not, however, over-state the problems of data gathering in 
China studies The same problems exist, to a different degree, m study-
ing foreign policies of other societies. With determinations, imaginat10ns, 
and, above al, cool and unemotional analyses of Beijmg’s policy be-
hav10r, we may come up with a more satisfactory explanation of Chinese 
foreign pohcy than the current partJal theories. 
(October 31, 1982) 
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中国外支政策の理論
〈要約〉
ノ、ーノfー ト s.イー
中国の外交政策行動を解明しようとするさまざまな試みが，それぞれ
の観点からなされている。「歴史アプローチ」は，中国の国内・対外両方
における歴史的経験を考慮してこそ中国の外交政策が正しく理解できる
と主張L，現代と過去の連続性を強調する。「勢力均衡アプローチ」によ
ると，中国は主にその安全保障を重視し，戦略的計算が米国，ソ連，日
本またその他の諸国に対する政策を規定している。「新イデオロギー・ア
プローチ」は，中国の外交政策は，世界政治における政治的諸力問の主
要矛盾に対する分析によって決定されるとする。「認知アプローチ」は，
中国の指導者たちは彼らの複雑な「決定規則」によって分析した全世界
の状況に対する規定と認識に沿って行動すると唱えている。これらの理
論は各々特有の欠点を持っと考えられる。
中国の外交政策行動の全容を明らかにするような一般理論は未だ提出
されていない。何故なら，第1に，中国の外交政策の独立変数各々にの
み分析が集中し，従属変数，状況変数，独立変数間の体系だった分析が
なされていないからである。第2に，中国研究者は，分析に過度に感情
的に巻き込まれている。第3に，開放的になった毛沢東以後でさえ，中
国政治・外交政策に関する資料が入手困難であるからだと言える。調査，
想像，そして冷静な分析によってこそ，現在の部分的な諸理論よりも充
分な説明ができると考えられる。
